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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to understand the determinants of lawsuits against auditors in securities class 
action litigation and the settlement pattern by auditors when the suit is not dismissed.  The issues 
we consider are: (i) when are auditors named as defendants (ii) when do auditors choose to settle 
and (iii) what proportion of the settlement do auditors pay in relation to the settlement by all the 
other parties; and  (iv) differences in settlement strategies among the big-n firms. This paper also 
examines how the lawsuit and settlement patterns have changed following the enactment of major 
regulation such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOX). Following prior literature, we first establish that auditors are more likely both to be named 
and to settle in cases involving restatement of earnings, accusations of violation of GAAP or 
accounting improprieties. We then show that the likelihood of suit and settlement increase in a 
measure that we construct measuring the complexity of litigation. We then examine differences in 
settlement patterns across periods preceding and after the passage of PSLRA and SOX. We find 
that auditors are named less often in the post PSLRA period (relative to the pre-PSLRA period), 
settle with the same frequency in both periods but pay less proportional damages. The same set of 
comparisons show that auditors are just as likely to be sued post-SOX as pre-SOX, but settle with 
lower frequency and pay the same proportion of damages. Overall this study documents the 
beneficial role of both PSLRA and SOX on reducing the litigation burden on auditors. With regard 
to settlement strategies, we document the varying strategies employed by the Big-n firms that settle 
at different rates, vary in their aggressiveness and time to settle signaling the willingness to fight 
or cooperate in the settlement.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental ideas underlying the Securities Acts of 1933-34 was to ensure an 
orderly flow of reliable information to financial markets. Among the different provisions adopted 
to ensure this uninterrupted flow were the creation of governmental bodies to regulate markets, 
primarily the SEC.  Further requirements were that financial statements filed with the SEC be 
certified by an independent auditor, and statutes (section 10b-5 and section 11) that allowed 
investors to pursue auditors (and other financial intermediaries) in the event that the information 
disclosed to markets turned out to be inaccurate. The goal of this paper is to examine how ex-post 
litigation under Sections 10b-5 and 11 have affected auditors over a long period from 1995-2012. 
The first point to note is that litigation has a significant impact on auditors especially the 
Big-4 who have faced threats of damages in the billions of dollars although actual settlements have 
been in the region of 1% of total revenues. This has become an area of interest for policy makers 
and public after the fall of Arthur Anderson in 2002, reducing the ‘big five’ accounting firms to 
‘big four’. ACAP (2008) documents through its survey of the big six largest auditing firms that 
they are defendants in ninety private actions related to audits of both private and public companies 
where the damage claims exceed $100 million in each case of which forty one cases sought 
damages in excess of $500 million, twenty- seven of these seeking damages in excess of $1 billion 
and seven cases seeking damages over $10 billion. In light of the damage claims, it is important to 
understand the litigation strategy of the audit firms and forces that drive the settlement.   
The second point is that malpractice cases against auditors rarely go to trial because of the 
vast uncertainties associated with actual trials.1 An exception was Laventhol & Howarth  which 
                                                            
1 The recent example of BDO Seidman vs. Esprito Santos is illustrative. BDO Seidman initially lost the case and 
Espritos Santos received a jury award of 521.7 million. In order to appeal, BDO had to post a bond of $60 million. 
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went bankrupt in 1990 while being the seventh largest American public accounting firm at the 
time. One of the reasons for the bankruptcy of Laventhol & Howarth was its aggressive litigation 
strategy, preferring court action to settlement (Stiner, 2010).  Settlements are easier for empirical 
analysis in that they are the final payment made in the case. In the rare instances when actual trials 
happen, the judgements are usually appealed in higher courts where they could be overturned 
resulting in settlements at a later date before the final verdict in the case is rendered. Given these 
facts, it makes sense to examine settlements in securities class action cases rather than trials. 
Consequently, we analyze all settlements made in cases filed under Sections 10b-5 and 11 of the 
securities acts over the period 1984-2011 to determine: 
i. When auditors are named as a defendant in a class-action suit; 
ii. When is the case against the auditor dismissed after the auditor is named (even 
though the case is pursued against the firm) 
iii. The percentage of the total settlement paid by the auditor if the case against the 
auditor is not dismissed. 
iv. Differences in settlement strategies among the big-n firms. 
We also examine how the enactment of two major acts which affected the provision of 
audit services, (i) PSLRA (Public Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995) and (ii) SOX (Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 2002) have changed the patterns of settlement reached by auditors.  
The process by which suits are initiated, pursued and settled involves many subtleties 
(P’ng, 1983). Our analysis examines whether factors such as the number and nature of plaintiffs 
and co-defendants affect the settlement by auditors. Further, we examine whether Big-5(n) firms 
differ systematically in their settlement patterns. In one of the first major empirical studies of 
                                                            
BDO won on appeal but further litigation is likely. If BDO had lost at this stage, they would have needed a bond of 
$500 million to appeal further, an amount that would have bankrupted the firm.   
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auditor litigation, Palmrose (1988) documented that one of the then Big-8 firms, Arthur Young, 
followed a very different strategy in terms of fighting rather than settling cases. As discussed 
earlier, almost no cases have gone to trial in recent years. However, the pattern of settlement seems 
to differ across auditors with PwC settling a significantly larger number of cases than the four 
other Big-5 auditors (Table 6a). Ernst & Young settling for a lesser percentage of the total 
settlement in a significantly larger number of cases in comparison with the other big-n firms (Table 
6b) and Deloitte not delaying its settlement after settlement by the company (usually the primary 
party in the case) is announced (Table 6c)2.  
The theory underlying the settlement process in trials is studied in P’ng (1983). The main 
argument in that paper is that the settlement process is driven by the uncertainty in the legal system. 
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants try to use the uncertainty to drive a harder bargain. The ability to 
‘bluff’ about willingness to go to trial is tested by both the parties.3 For example, if the auditor is 
reluctant to go to trial due to the perceived risks, the plaintiff attorney takes advantage of the 
situation to drive a hard bargain. The uncertainty in class action cases have been driven both by 
uncertainty about pleading standards and uncertainty about the size of damage awards.4 The other 
factor unique to auditors more than many other defendants in securities class action litigation is 
the number of times they are named as defendants usually by the same law firm representing the 
plaintiff.  This repeated interaction provides an incentive for the auditor to build a reputation. One 
strategy is to never settle, so plaintiff law firms go after other easier targets. In this case it might 
                                                            
2 In discussion we had with one of the CEO of a Big-4 firm, we gathered that litigation filed against the various 
offices is managed by a central office with counsel assisted by partner/s and support staff. This adds support to our 
analysis of litigation strategies at the firm level.  
3 The American judicial system provides incentives to the defendants to cooperate with the federal or state 
prosecutor through lesser penalty than if the defendant did not cooperate. Files (2012) finds that cooperation and 
forthright disclosure reduces the monetary penalties charged by the SEC. In this study the plaintiff and defendants 
are private parties and there is no such incentive for cooperation. 
4 One of the recommendations made in CCMR (2006) was to resolve the considerable uncertainty in application of 
Rule 10b-5 liability existing as a result of conflicting interpretations by courts.   
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be rational to accept additional costs to fight in court so as to deter future lawsuits.  Another factor, 
absent in P’ng (1983) but of importance given the long time period of our data, is evolving legal 
expertise. A small set of plaintiff law firms specialize in class action cases whereas legal consulting 
firms such as Cornerstone have developed models that help defend corporations and auditors.5  
While specific twists and turns in the legal system affect settlement patterns, we are more generally 
concerned with systemic uncertainty. We hypothesize that as uncertainty decreases for some 
classes of defendant, they should be less willing to settle or to settle for smaller amounts. 
In response to increasing litigation losses, the audit firms lobbied for tort reform.6 As a 
consequence of this lobbying as well as other factors, Congress enacted the PSLRA in 1995. Two 
important provisions in this act applying to auditors was the replacement of joint-and-several 
liability by proportional liability and a requirement to establish the merits of the suit at an early 
stage increasing the probability of summary dismissal.7 In the case of Adelphia that filed for 
bankruptcy in 2002, losses claimed by investors were as high as $5.5 billion. However, the 
settlement reached was for $455 million, of which $210 million was paid by the auditor Deloitte 
which audited the firm from the mid-1980’s to 2002. The remaining $245 million was paid by 38 
banks which underwrote stock offerings and extended syndicated loans to Adelphia (Bloomberg 
news, 2006).  The establishment of a new standard of proportional liability coupled with a higher 
probability of dismissal was expected to lead to a lower number of suits Johnson et. al. (2007).  
Hillegeist (1999) examines the effect of alternate damage apportionment rules and finds that audit 
failure rate can decrease when there is a switch from a joint-and-several liability regime to 
                                                            
5 Perhaps the most aggressive plaintiff law firm was headed by William S. Lerach; this law firm was eventually 
wound up.  
6 In the 1992 Statement of Position by the Big-6 firms at the time, the firms argued that: ‘The principal causes of the 
auditing profession’s liability problems are unwarranted litigation and coerced settlements...and... the principal 
cause of unwarranted litigation against the profession is joint-and-several liability’’ (Arthur Andersen et al. 1992). 
7 Another important provision for firms was a “Safe-Harbor” provision relating to forward looking disclosures.  
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proportional liability rule. In addition, it may be expected to reduce the share of the damages paid 
by the auditor. While there were some initial changes in litigation rates, they proved to be 
temporary with securities class actions reverting to pre-PSLRA levels (or even higher Buckberg 
et. al (2005)). However, the number of dismissals also appeared to increase as shown in Table 1b 
and documented in many studies.  Apart from a conference presentation in Palmrose (2005), 
auditor in settlement has not, to our knowledge been examined in the prior literature. The reduction 
in (relative) risk for the auditor, should, in theory, lead to both a lower probability of settlement 
and a lower proportion paid by the auditor with regard to the total settlement. Our empirical results 
support both these hypotheses.  
The second major regulatory event with regard to auditing was the enactment of SOX. The 
effect of SOX on settlement patterns are less clear from a theoretical perspective. First, SOX 
increased the scope of the audit imposing greater risk on auditors. However, it also required higher 
levels of due care and documentation both on auditors and on firms increasing audit quality. Both 
these possibilities have been advanced in earlier studies on SOX and they lead to opposite 
predictions with regard to settlement patterns. If the increased audit responsibilities make it easier 
to prove audit failure, we should expect to see both a greater probability and a greater level of 
auditor settlement. In contrast, if the audit quality increases, we should expect to see a lower 
probability of settlements. Since the provisions of SOX increased both the firm level controls and 
audit level controls, we would expect a less significant effect on settlement proportions. Our 
empirical results suggest that auditors are settling fewer cases in the Post-SOX era but are paying 
the same proportion of the total settlement as in the pre-SOX era.  
We also control for the effects of accounting restatements and bankruptcy, two variable 
that have been shown to increase the probability and the amount of auditor settlements (Palmrose 
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and Scholz (2004)). Consistent with prior studies we find that restatements and bankruptcy 
increase both the probability of the auditor settling the case and the proportion of the settlement 
paid by the auditor. While the analysis in terms of restatements is straightforward, the 
interpretation of the increased proportion in the case of bankruptcy could be attributable to a “deep 
pockets” effect where the auditors are allocated a greater proportion with settlements being held 
to similar levels as cases where the firm is not bankrupt or as a consequence of the fact that total 
damages are reduced due to the fact that the bankrupt firm cannot afford to pay large amounts 
while the auditor’s share is held constant.  
The next issue that we examine is whether there are significant differences in the settlement 
patterns across the Big-4. Palmrose (1988) documents that Arthur Young followed a different 
litigation strategy from the other seven (then Big-8) firms. We find that while the other Big-4 firms 
are indistinguishable, PwC has a statistically greater rate of settlement. The greater settlement rate 
could simply reflect a different bargaining policy rather than as a reflection on audit quality. 
Specifically, firms have to trade off the costs of defending themselves as compared with the cost 
of settling. As discussed in P’ng (1983) the optimal policy for the defendant   is a mixed strategy 
of fighting some cases and settling others. The proportion depends on many factors including 
beliefs about what would happen should the case go to trial. Differences in settlement strategies 
are just as likely to arise out of perceptions of uncertainty in the legal system as they are to arise 
from the likelihood of audit failure.  
The last issue that we examine is with regard to the complexity of the legal case. Greater 
complexity implies more uncertainty with regard to the ultimate outcome which will affect the 
settlement process and outcomes. We select five factors that are potentially related to the 
complexity of the case: (i) whether an institutional investor is a plaintiff; (ii) the number of 
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plaintiffs; (iii) the number of other defendants, (iv) the number of institutions and (v) the class 
period. We use factor analysis to construct a single complexity measure out of these four variables. 
We then examine whether this factor affects the probability that the auditor will be named as a (co-
defendant), the likelihood that the auditor would settle and the proportional share paid by the 
auditor. As expected, both the likelihood of the auditor being named, and the likelihood of an 
auditor settlement increase with the complexity measure; however, the proportion paid by the 
auditor is unaffected by the complexity of litigation. The inference that we draw is that complexity, 
as in the comparison across pre and post-SOX periods, makes the auditor more willing to settle 
but does not differentially affect the level of settlement as compared with other defendants.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine carefully the fraction paid by the 
auditor with regard to the total settlement. By adding this variable to the analysis, we are able to 
contrast the changes in settlement patterns when comparing the pre and post PSLRA period as 
opposed to the comparison across pre and post SOX period.  The probability that the auditor will 
be named as a defendant reduces in the post PSLRA period as does the proportion of damages paid 
by the auditor as may be expected by the shift from joint-and-several liability to proportional 
liability. In contrast, the comparison across pre and post SOX shows a significant reduction in the 
probability that the auditor will settle as may be expected by an increase in audit standards but it 
has an insignificant effect on the auditor being named as a defendant or the proportion of damages 
paid by the defendant. While these effects may not be directly attributable to the enactment of 
regulation, they are consistent with the changes in settlement patterns suggested by the theory due 
to the changes in perception of the risk associated with taking the case to trial.  
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The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review and 
hypothesis development; Section 3 discusses the data, variables used and the research design, 
while Section 4 discusses the results. The conclusions are provided in Section 5.  
 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Class action lawsuits has faced severe criticism, with many claiming it encourages 
frivolous lawsuit by lawyers who force the firm to settle for small amounts even when there is no 
merit to the case. On the other hand many see it as another form of regulation to curb bad behavior 
of managers. Park (2017) notes that auditors are part of the settlement in a third of the 200 largest 
securities class action settlement between the periods 1996 and 2007 and this is a higher percentage 
than all of the securities class action.  We hypothesize that only cases that merit accusing auditors 
of shirking in their responsibility name auditors as defendants along with other parties in the case, 
leading us to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1a: Accounting issues increases the probability of auditor being named in the 
securities class action lawsuit, the likelihood of auditor settling the lawsuit and paying a higher 
proportion of the settlement relative to all other parties settling the lawsuit. 
Bankruptcy leaves the shareholders with very little recourse as the firm has very little 
money left if any after paying its creditors. This will lead them to turn to the auditors questioning 
whether they shirked on their fiduciary duty to properly inform the shareholders on the true 
financial condition of the firm. Shareholders will target the audit firm as one of the parties left with 
'deep pockets' (Bar-Yosef and Sarath (2005)). This leads us to the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Bankruptcy of sued firm increases the probability of auditor being named 
in the securities class action lawsuit, the likelihood of auditor settling the lawsuit and paying a 
higher proportion of the settlement relative to all other parties settling the lawsuit. 
One of the important measures adopted in PSLRA was to discourage these frivolous 
lawsuits, encourage institutional investors to bring cases, and appointment of lead plaintiffs. It also 
raised the standard for admissibility of the lawsuit and increased the chances of frivolous lawsuit 
to be dismissed early.  However the regulation did not make any changes to the standards for 
settlement, however as discussed earlier it changed the method used for assessing damages to a 
proportional system. This leads us to hypothesize that- 
Hypothesis 2: The enactment of PSLRA decreased litigation against auditors and the 
proportion of damages paid by auditors. 
Similar to PSLRA, SOX legislation was not without its criticism, one of the major criticism 
was the increased cost associated with auditing a firm. The benefits of this cost was uncertain. 
DeFond and Francis (2005) question whether the radical reforms made in SOX were really needed 
and what the unintended consequences of the legislation are. The increased cost of auditing can be 
thought of in two ways. The additional amount charged was a insurance premium charged on a 
portfolio of firms audited against a few large future settlements. It could also be a cost for carrying 
out more work in the audit and keeping documentation for the work performed. This would lead 
to a higher quality audit and reduce the chances of settlement in the future. We test the following 
hypothesis stated in the alternate form.  
Hypothesis 3: The enactment of SOX decreased the probability of auditor settlement. 
As discussed earlier litigation strategy by the various firms would be different, some might 
choose to fight every case providing a signal to the market. We examine the settlement strategy of 
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the audit firms and test if there is variation in the settlement rates, settlement ratio or time to settle 
compared to other firms leading us to  
Hypothesis 4: There is variation in the litigation strategy among the big-n audit firms 
 
 
3. Data and Research Design.  
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
Data on auditor litigation and settlement are culled from many sources for lawsuits filed 
between 1986 and 20118. Woodruff-Sawyer litigation database, settlement agreements, Stanford 
class action alert, and the popular press. We do not include lawsuits that are active or related to 
private companies, not-for-profit organizations and mutual funds to isolate securities law 
violations related to only financial reporting. Our final sample has 2503 class action lawsuits. In 
358 of these lawsuits auditor is named as a party to the litigation. Table 1a provides the various 
dimensions of the data used for different analysis. Of the 358 cases where auditors are named, 
auditors settle for varying amounts in 166 of the cases. For a separate analysis we take the largest 
56 settlements that were settled by the auditor for more than $ 10 million.  Kaplan and Williams 
(2013) uses a similar method for data collection, but restrict their analysis to only financially 
distressed firms. The sample size if we adopt the restrictions is comparable. Talley (2006) also 
uses a similar method for data collection to understand the probability of a cataclysmic liability 
among big four auditors. The sample we have collected is comparable if we take into consideration 
the time period of the sample.  
                                                            
8 Other current papers studying securities class action eg. Kempf & Spalt (2018) also use data ending in 2011, as it is 
the last year in which reliable data is available in litigation datasets.  
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Table 1b provides the distribution of the sample over the years. In the early periods there 
are only a few cases. 19 percent of the cases are in the pre-PSLRA period before the enactment of 
PSLRA at the end of 1995.  
Table 1c provides the distribution of the cases by industry based on the two digit SIC code. 
We list the largest 17 industries which had at least five cases where the auditor was named.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. The average settlement in class action 
litigation is $21.7 million which is comparable to the average settlement by the auditor of $19.7 
million, however the sample sizes are vastly different. There are many cases where the auditor is 
not named or does not settle.  The average time between filing of the lawsuit and the first 
settlement, usually by the company is about 2.16 years. We hand-collected the dates of the 
settlement by the auditor from settlement agreements and news reports for settlements larger than 
$10 million by the auditor and we find that in a few cases the settlement by the auditor is around 
the time of the settlement by the company. However in many instances auditors settle after 
becoming aware of the total settlement of the company. The average time between the settlement 
by the company and the auditor is 463.58 days. The average class period is 174.16 days and extends 
to a median value of close to a year. This provides a window into the bargaining game played by 
the parties. 
 
3.2 Variables 
We use a set of accounting variables to understand the importance of accounting issues in 
the probability of the auditor being named, settles and the proportion of the settlements. The three 
accounting variables used are one, SEC investigation. SEC investigations is one, if there was a 
SEC investigation unrelated to the filing of the case but based on the details in the case. It is zero, 
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otherwise. Earnings restatement is one if there was a earnings restatement around the time of the 
filing of the lawsuit, zero otherwise. These earnings restatements are the ones classified as 
intentional misstatements. Hennes, Leone and Miller (2008) document that there was only one 
restatement that was classified as in error according to their classification that resulted in class 
action lawsuit while a majority of the restatements classified as intentional resulted in class action 
litigation. We have a dummy variable that equals one if there are accounting issues or GAAP 
violations, zero if there is no allegation of accounting improprieties or GAAP violations.  
We have the next set of variables to understand the differential effect of regulation such as 
SOX and PSLRA on auditor being named as a party to the case, auditor settling the case and the 
proportion of the auditor settlement to the total settlement. We have a dummy of one if the lawsuit 
was filed on or after the 23rd of December 1995 for PSLRA and 30th of July 2002 for SOX. Earlier 
periods are coded as zero.  
We then have three variables that indicate the difference in lawsuits that auditors face most 
commonly. The first is bankruptcy which take a value of one if the firm that is the subject of the 
lawsuit declares bankruptcy before or soon after the filing of the lawsuit, zero otherwise. Section 
11 and rule 10b-5 lawsuits have different standards of proof under PSLRA. In simple terms there 
was no change in section 11 lawsuit which is based on misleading disclosure related to securities 
issue in the pre and post PSLRA periods. However, Rule 10b-5 lawsuits were the focus of the 
PSLRA and the law was aimed at reducing those lawsuits. It is important to consider that section 
11 lawsuit can only be made in cases alleging misleading disclosure related to a securities issue. 
So some section 11 cases also involve rule 10b-5 allegations.  
The factors that contribute to complexity of litigation is measured by number of institutions 
bringing the case, if case is taken to court by an institutional investor, number of law firms 
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representing the plaintiff, number of defendants other than the auditor and the class period.  We 
conduct factor analysis and report one litigation complexity factor. Many of these variables are 
shown to be important in prior literature. All variables load in the expected direction, and the single 
factor explains 88.75% of the total variation of the five factors (eigenvalue of 1.105). Our results 
are qualitatively similar even if we include all these variables in the multivariate analysis.  
 
3.3 Research design 
We conduct our analysis in three stages. In the first analysis we take all the lawsuits filed 
for which we have the necessary information and exclude only the cases that are still active in 
court. The first variable of interest for us is Auditor Named which is one if the auditor is named in 
the lawsuit, zero if the auditor is not named.  In the second analysis we only take cases where the 
auditor was named in the litigation and have the variable Auditor Settled which takes on a value 
of one if the auditor eventually settled, zero otherwise.  The last step is to understand the proportion 
of the payment made the auditor to the total settlement by all parties. The total settlement by all 
parties is in many cases different from the settlement amount listed in many of the datasets. We go 
through news sources and settlement agreements to correctly compute the total settlement paid by 
all parties.   
To conduct the first analysis, we take all cases that were later dismissed or settled to 
understand the probability of the auditor being named as one of the parties to the case. We run a 
logit regression with Auditor Named as the dependent variable and understand the effect of 
accounting variables (SEC investigation, Earnings restatement, accounting issues or GAAP 
violations). Regulatory dummies for PSLRA and SOX. Dummies of lawsuit characteristic 
(Bankruptcy, Section 11, Rule 10b-5). We also include the complexity factor obtained from the 
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factor analysis of five factors detailed in the previous section.  We expect the accounting variables 
to be significant consistent with Hypothesis 1a. to indicate that auditors are named when there is 
are problems related to the accounting or auditing at the firm.  We expect the post PSLRA dummy 
to be significant indicating that more meritorious cases were made before the court due to the 
heightened pleading standards consistent with hypothesis 29.  In bankruptcy cases the plaintiff 
lawyers know they would not be able to recover much from the firm that is going through 
bankruptcy and so will have to recover the damages from the auditor or other parties who had a 
fiduciary duty to inform the public in a timely fashion the impending financial problems at the 
firm. This is consistent with hypothesis 1b. Section 11 lawsuit as we discussed earlier did not 
change much in the post PSLRA period and so we expect the auditors to be named with a higher 
probability. We expect the complexity factor to be significant based on prior literature that has 
shown that the auditor is likely to be named when the class period is larger, when an institutional 
investor takes the firm to court.  We have three models, the first one includes both the SOX and 
PSLRA dummies. Because of difficulty in interpreting interaction effects in a logit regression we 
conduct two separate analyses in which we include only one of the regulatory dummies in each of 
the regression. We follow the same methodology in all our analysis. 
The second analysis is similar to the one above but only includes the sample where auditor 
is named and discards the remaining sample. We call this the Auditor Settled which takes on a 
value of one if the auditor eventually settled, zero otherwise. The logit regression is similar to the 
one above. Here we expect the auditor to settle only when there is merit to the case i.e. there are 
                                                            
9 Consistent with the Act’s objective, Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard (2002), find evidence that accounting and insider trading 
variables explain the filing of post-PSLRA SCA lawsuits but are insignificant in the pre-PSLRA period, suggesting that PSLRA 
discouraged frivolous lawsuits.  In examining the details of the lawsuits post-PSLRA, Perino (2003) finds the overall case quality 
improvement to be statistically significant.  Choi, Nelson and Pritchard (2009) also find that pre-PSLRA nuisance claims are less 
likely to be filed under the PSLRA regime. Krishna Moorthy (2012) finds a higher turnover of CEOs in the securities class action 
sample studied indicating more meritorious lawsuits being admitted in court following the passage of PSLRA. 
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accounting issues as maintained in hypothesis 1a. We expect SEC investigation, earnings 
restatement and accounting issues or GAAP violations to result in settlement by the auditor. We 
expect settlement in the post-SOX period to be less because of the many procedures and checks 
placed on the auditor. This in turn has improved the audit quality and reduced the chances of the 
auditor to be found at fault. Hence we expect the variable to negatively related to settlement 
consistent with hypothesis 3. This provides for the evidence that auditors in employing greater 
procedures and checks on internal control incur a greater cost in conducting the audit but suffer 
lesser damages from lawsuit. We do not expect any effect on PSLRA as the laws was intended to 
reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits and had no effect on the settlements. We do not expect 
auditors to settle in a greater or lesser proportion in bankruptcy cases, section 11 lawsuit or rule 
10b-5 lawsuits.  
In the next analysis we are interested in understanding the proportion of the payment made 
by auditors to total class action settlement paid by all defendants including the auditors. We are 
interested in understanding the effectiveness of the change in PSLRA from joint and several 
liability to proportional liability which the auditors lobbied before and during the passage of 
PSLRA. .  
We include an additional factor of the time period between filing and settlement to 
understand if there was any effect on the settlement. It is assumed that early settlements are settled 
for a lesser amount, but long drawn out cases cost more for both the parties and the disagreements 
are greater leading to larger settlement amounts.  Section 11 lawsuit damages are capped and are 
less severe than in 10b-5 lawsuits. Due to difficulty of obtaining dates of smaller settlements by 
auditors we restrict our analysis in the next step to only 56 cases where the settlement by the auditor 
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was larger than $10 million. We are interested in understanding if there is prolonged negotiation 
and bargaining when auditor pays a greater proportion of the settlement.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of the logistic regression estimating the probability of auditor 
being named in the securities class action lawsuit. In panel 1, we find the probability of auditor 
being named in the lawsuit increases by 11% and 13% following restatement of earnings and 
accounting improprieties or violations of GAAP respectively, holding other variables at their 
median. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1a and provides further evidence that class action 
lawsuit against auditors are based on serious accounting problems at the firm.  We find the 
probability of auditor being named decreases by 11% following passage of PSLRA, consistent 
with hypothesis 2. We also find that the probability of auditor being named in cases of bankruptcy 
cases increases by 8.5% consistent with hypothesis 1b.  We also find that the probability of auditor 
being named in section 11 cases relating to issuance of security increases by 7%.  The probability 
of auditor being named increases with the complexity of litigation variable we devised for the 
study.  
Table 4 provides results of the logistic regression on the probability of the auditor settling 
the case, once named. Here we find the probability of the auditor settling increases by 14% and 
18% when there is restatement of earnings and accounting issues or violation of GAAP 
respectively consistent with hypothesis 1a. The most interesting finding is that the probability of 
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settling decreases by 13.1% following the passage of SOX, consistent with hypothesis 3. We 
interpret the result as indirect evidence of improvement in audit quality following the passage of 
SOX. The additional steps taken by the auditors and the firm provides greater documentation to 
support the work carried out. This provides greater evidence against the auditor being at fault 
reducing the likelihood of settlement. Consistent with other studies that have shown greater 
settlement rates when case is handled by an institutional investor, or when the class period is long, 
we find that the chance of auditors settling is higher in complex litigation. The results are also 
consistent with Donelson and Prentice (2012) examine 144 cases filed between 1996 to 2005 
where auditors were named as defendant and examine factors affecting settlement by auditors for 
more than $5 million and find that restatements, high audit fees and SEC enforcement were 
significant in explaining auditor settlements. 
Table 5a examines the determinants of the percentage of total settlement paid by the 
auditor. The results show that lesser percentage is paid by the auditor following the passage of 
PSLRA. One of the provisions as it related to auditors was the change from joint and several 
liability to one of proportional liability. However we find that the proportion paid in bankruptcy 
cases is higher. This could be due to one of two reasons, either the damages assessed on the auditor 
are the same regardless of whether the company went bankrupt or not. However the bankrupt 
company is not able to pay the damages it is supposed to pay. This reduces the denominator making 
the ratio higher. It could also be that the shareholders suffered damage due to the auditor not 
reporting the true financial condition in a timely fashion. This might make the Judge or other party 
apportion a higher than normal proportion of the damage on the auditor making the proportion 
paid by the auditor. We also find that the auditor is responsible for a lesser percentage of the total 
settlement in section 11 lawsuits.  Table 5b extends the analysis to include only cases that were 
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settled for more than $10 million and includes an additional variable measuring the time between 
settlements in the securities class action by the company to the settlement by the auditor. This 
indicates resolution of some of the uncertainties in the case as the settlement by the company which 
is usually the major party. We find in cases where the percentage share of the total settlement by 
the auditor is high, the time taken by the auditor to negotiate a settlement is greater indicating both 
parties driving a hard bargain. The sample is restricted to only large settlements in this analysis 
because of the difficulty in obtaining the dates (usually from news reports) of the settlement when 
the settlement by the auditor is less than $10 million. Also, since this analysis only included large 
settlements by auditor, the correlation between Accounting issues or GAAP violations and SEC 
investigation is very high and hence the variable Accounting issues or GAAP violations is 
excluded in the analysis.  
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis of differential settlement strategies of Big-n firms 
We perform chi-square test on each of the five big-5 firm settlements during our sample 
period. We document the variations in strategies of the big-5 firms. To make the analysis easier 
we group firms that merged later as part of one of the big-5 firm. 
In Table 6a, we find that PwC settles a significantly larger proportion of the cases compared 
to the rest of the big-4 firms. PwC settled 44 of the 69 cases it was involved in, however the rest 
of the firms together settled only 121 of the 289 cases they were involved in. This difference in 
ratio is significant at the 1% level.  Table 6b examines the ratio of Ernst & Young settlements to 
total settlement by all parties in the case. The table shows Ernst & Young settles 19 cases paying 
a lesser percentage than the median in majority of the 25 cases they were named. In comparison 
other firms pay above median percentages in 77 of the 141 cases. This difference is significant at 
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the 1% level. Finally in Table 6c we examine the delay in settlement by the auditor after the 
announcement of settlement by the company in the securities class action lawsuit. Deloitte delays 
settlement above the median time to settle in 2 of the 10 cases where the settlement is above $10 
million. In comparison other firms delay settlement in 26 of the 46 cases. The difference in ratio 
is significant at the 5% level.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines auditor litigation and settlements over the entire data period stretching 
from 1985-2014. While earlier studies have examined portions of these periods, the study of the 
entire period allows us to draw some interesting inferences on long-term shifts in settlement 
patterns. In addition, we analyze the proportion of the total settlement paid by auditors, a factor 
that is absent in earlier studies.  
We show that the changes in litigation settlements across the pre and post PSLRA period 
exhibits a different pattern when compared with the changes across the pre and post SOX periods. 
While the primary difference across pre and post SOX periods is a lower probability of settlement, 
the main difference in the pre and post PSLRA period is a decrease in the proportion of the 
settlement paid by auditors.  
We also document that there are significant differences in settlement rates across the Big-
5 auditors. We conjecture that these differences may represent strategic choices in balancing actual 
and potential legal costs with the costs of settling the lawsuit. In addition, we show that the 
proportion of damages paid by the auditor in cases involving bankruptcy is significantly higher 
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than in other cases. An interesting question we hope to address in the future is whether this is due 
to the fact that auditors are assessed a larger share of the penalty despite laws on proportional 
damages or whether the total settlements are smaller relative to the class damage when the firm 
goes bankrupt.  
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Table 1a Sample Description 
  
Securities class action litigation filed between 1984 
to 2011 2503 
Auditor named in litigation 358 
Auditor settles in litigation 166 
Auditor settles for more than $10 Million 56 
 
Table 1b Sample size by year 
  
Year All class action Auditor named 
     1984 2 1 
1985 1 0 
1986 1 0 
1987 2 2 
1988 5 2 
1989 13 3 
1990 31 4 
1991 17 4 
1992 30 8 
1993 65 12 
1994 170 22 
1995 140 11 
1996 82 9 
1997 140 19 
1998 190 35 
1999 163 22 
2000 163 23 
2001 375 22 
2002 169 43 
2003 133 18 
2004 152 19 
2005 116 17 
2006 80 16 
2007 100 17 
2008 80 14 
2009 48 9 
2010 26 3 
2011 9 3 
Total 2503 358 
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Table 1c Sample by industry 
   
SIC- two 
digit Industry All class action Auditor named 
      73 Business Services 476 56 
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 184 28 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 251 26 
60 Depository Institutions 74 20 
49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 62 18 
61 Nondepository Institutions 48 15 
63 Insurance Carriers 78 15 
50 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 61 14 
48 Communications 130 14 
28 Chemical & Allied Products 208 13 
38 Instruments & Related Products 117 11 
80 Health Services 63 10 
67 Holding & Other Investment Offices 42 9 
37 Transportation Equipment 28 8 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 53 8 
87 Engineering & Management Services 31 6 
58 Eating & Drinking Places 21 5 
All other 576 82 
  Total 2503 358 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics   
   
  Mean Median 
Total settlement in class action $21,700,000 $2,700,000 
Number of defendants 6 5 
Number of Plaintiff lawyers 1.96 1 
Class action period 174.16 days 349 days 
Number of institutions 0.482 0 
Time between filing of case and first settlement 
date 792 days 867 days 
    
Total Auditor Settlement $19,700,000 $4,800,000 
Auditor settlement /Total settlement by all parties 0.3989 0.2674 
Time between auditor settlement and first 
settlement in class action, only large settlements of 
more than $10 Million 463.58 210 days 
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Table 3 Results of logistic regression estimating the probability of auditor being named (Auditor 
Named) in the securities class action lawsuit based on accounting related variables, regulatory 
regime,  complexity of litigation.    
 
Dependent Variable – Auditor Named (0,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables       
      Intercept -2.964*** -2.948*** -3.333*** 
  (0.281) (0.279) (0.285) 
SEC Investigation 0.377** 0.323* 0.385** 
  (0.181) (0.177) (0.176) 
Earnings restatement 1.066*** 1.102*** 0.908*** 
  (0.148) (0.147) (0.140) 
accounting issues or GAAP violations 1.837*** 1.790*** 1.844*** 
  (0.216) (0.211) (0.220) 
Post-SOX -0.247  -0.452***   (0.153)  (0.142) Post-PSLRA -1.027*** -1.136***   
  (0.194) (0.186)   
Bankruptcy 0.800*** 0.825*** 0.700*** 
  (0.169) (0.168) (0.165) 
Section 11 lawsuit 0.733*** 0.747*** 0.643*** 
  (0.148) (0.147) (0.146) 
Rule 10b-5 lawsuit -0.0538 -0.0449 -0.404** 
  (0.211) (0.212) (0.203) 
Complexity factor 0.400*** 0.380*** 0.354*** 
  (0.0710) (0.0693) (0.0685) 
      N 2,503 2,503 2,503 
Pseudo R-squared 18.19 18.05 16.93 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4 Results of logistic regression estimating the probability of auditor settling (Auditor 
Settled) the case after being named in the securities class action lawsuit based on accounting 
related variables, regulatory regime, complexity of litigation.    
 
Dependent Variable – Auditor Settled (0,1) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables       
      Intercept -0.911 -0.925 -0.937 
  (0.575) (0.569) (0.571) 
SEC Investigation 0.319 0.207 0.317 
  (0.296) (0.292) (0.295) 
Earnings restatement 0.592** 0.699*** 0.565** 
  (0.252) (0.250) (0.241) 
accounting issues or GAAP violations 0.804* 0.808* 0.790* 
  (0.465) (0.458) (0.467) 
Post-SOX -0.534**  -0.564**   (0.260)  (0.250) Post-PSLRA -0.141 -0.391   
  (0.369) (0.354)   
Bankruptcy 0.249 0.274 0.230 
  (0.276) (0.273) (0.269) 
Section 11 lawsuit 0.107 0.101 0.108 
  (0.243) (0.240) (0.243) 
Rule 10b-5 lawsuit -0.258 -0.270 -0.310 
  (0.402) (0.400) (0.379) 
Complexity factor 0.352*** 0.335*** 0.344*** 
  (0.111) (0.111) (0.109) 
      N 358 358 358 
Pseudo R-squared 7.65 6.78 7.62 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5a OLS regression of auditor settlement as a percentage of total settlement by 
all defendants on accounting related variables, regulatory regime, complexity of 
litigation.   
 
 
Dependent Variable –  $ value of auditor settlement to the total settlement by all the 
parties in the litigation.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables       
        
Intercept 0.268** 0.268** 0.263* 
  (0.130) (0.127) (0.143) 
SEC Investigation 0.0637 0.0783 0.0462 
  (0.0860) (0.0902) (0.0838) 
Earnings restatement 0.0220 0.00985 -0.0163 
  (0.0626) (0.0583) (0.0605) 
accounting issues or GAAP violations 0.166 0.153 0.0915 
  (0.160) (0.157) (0.180) 
Post-SOX 0.0825  0.0308   (0.0774)  (0.0711) Post-PSLRA -0.319** -0.285**   
  (0.134) (0.121)   
Bankruptcy 0.354*** 0.352*** 0.309*** 
  (0.107) (0.106) (0.102) 
Section 11 lawsuit -0.264*** -0.258*** -0.243*** 
  (0.0771) (0.0734) (0.0753) 
Rule 10b-5 lawsuit 0.130 0.131 0.0239 
  (0.105) (0.103) (0.106) 
Complexity factor -0.0223 -0.0223 -0.0388 
  (0.0282) (0.0289) (0.0271) 
Time between lawsuit filing and settlement 0.0891 0.102 0.0438 
  (0.0652) (0.0645) (0.0591) 
      N 166 166 166 
R-squared 0.223 0.216 0.181 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5b OLS regression of auditor settlement greater than 10 Million dollars (large settlement) as 
a percentage of total settlement by all defendants on accounting related variables, regulatory 
regime, complexity of litigation.   
 
 
Dependent Variable - $ value of auditor settlement greater than $10million to the total settlement 
by all  the parties in the litigation  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables       
        
Intercept 0.0228 -0.0403 0.0890 
  (0.125) (0.114) (0.114) 
SEC Investigation -0.00980 -0.00344 -0.00517 
  (0.103) (0.104) (0.103) 
Earnings restatement -0.0330 -0.0349 -0.0295 
  (0.0811) (0.0853) (0.0794) 
Post-SOX 0.154  0.160   (0.127)  (0.123) Post-PSLRA 0.0971 0.149*   
  (0.0920) (0.0865)   
Bankruptcy 0.342*** 0.297*** 0.351*** 
  (0.0908) (0.0875) (0.0878) 
Section 11 lawsuit -0.259** -0.211** -0.268*** 
  (0.104) (0.0933) (0.0963) 
Rule 10b-5 lawsuiit 0.174*** 0.203*** 0.198*** 
  (0.0551) (0.0695) (0.0651) 
Complexity factor -0.0241 -0.0230 -0.0209 
  (0.0449) (0.0479) (0.0418) 
Time between lawsuit filing and settlement 0.0123 0.0459 0.00762 
  (0.0715) (0.0721) (0.0701) 
Time between settlement by auditor and the first 
settlement in the class action 0.140* 0.124 0.139* 
  (0.0743) (0.0781) (0.0738) 
      Observations 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.366 0.329 0.363 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6a Results of Chi-Square test showing the difference in 
settlement strategies of PwC compared to other big-n firms.  
 
                          PwC named in case 
    No Yes Total 
  No 168 25 193 
Settlements      
  Yes 121 44 165 
         
Total   289 69 358 
     
Pearson Chi-Square = 10.5575 Probability = 0.001     
 
Table 6b Results of Chi-Square test showing ratio of Ernst & Young 
Settlement to total settlement by all parties is above median. 
 
Ernst & Young settling the case 
    No Yes Total 
% Settlement above 
median 
No 64 19 83 
        
Yes 77 6 83 
          
Total   141 25 166 
       
Pearson Chi-Square  =   6.5652   Probability = 0.010 
 
Table 6c Results of Chi-Square test showing Deloitte settlement delay is 
above median. 
      Deloitte settling in cases for above $10 Million 
    No Yes Total 
Settlement Delay is above 
median 
No 20 8 28 
        
Yes 26 2 28 
          
Total   46 10 56 
 
     Pearson Chi-Square  =   4.1387   Probability = 0.042 
 
